Introduction
The recent adjudication of whether it is permissible to convict a person for genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide for the same events aptly demonstrates Justice Hassan Bubacar Jallow's pursuit of justice at the international level. As the Chief Prosecutor of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) since 2003, Justice Jallow has led the investigation and prosecution of persons alleged to be responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law during the violence that engulfed Rwanda in 1994. In 2011, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR ("Prosecution") appealed the decision of an ICTR Trial Chamber to convict Jean-Baptiste Gatete for genocide but not for conspiracy to commit genocide despite finding that the accused person was responsible for both crimes. The Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber "had a duty to enter convictions for both crimes to fully capture the [accused's] entire criminal culpability, and to respect the mandate of this Tribunal established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious international crimes."1 This chapter will trace the Prosecution's successful appeal in the JeanBaptiste Gatete case before the ICTR. To set the appeal in its proper context, the chapter will first provide a brief overview of jurisprudence of the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) relating to cumulative convictions. The chapter will then turn to the Gatete case at the trial level, identifying the reasons for the Trial Chamber's decision to enter a conviction for genocide but not for conspiracy. Next, the chapter will set out the related submissions of both parties on appeal before presenting the Appeals Chamber's analysis and resolution of the appeal.
Cumulative Convictions
The jurisprudence of the Tribunal permits cumulative convictions (convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the same conduct) only if each of the statutory provisions has a materially distinct element not contained in the other.2 This rule was laid down by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Čelebići case where the Appeals Chamber further explained that "[a]n element is materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other."3 In the Musema case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber concluded that this test "reflects general, objective criteria enabling a Chamber to determine when it may enter or affirm multiple convictions based on the same acts" and held it to be applicable in cases before the ICTR.4 Consequently, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has confirmed that convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity are permissible even when based on the same set of facts.5 This is because the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group is an element of the crime of genocide but not of the crime of extermination. Extermination requires proof that the crime was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population which is not an element of genocide.6 On the other hand, in Ntabakuze, the Appeals Chamber found error where the Trial Chamber entered cumulative convictions for murder and extermination as crimes against humanity because murder does not contain an element that is materially distinct from extermination, failing the reciprocal specialty test.7 While the Čelebići case and its progeny at both the ICTR and
